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Abstract
We present a model where firms compete for scarce managerial talent (“alpha”)
and managers are risk-averse. When managers cannot move across firms after
being hired, employers learn about their talent, allocate them efficiently to
projects and provide insurance to low-quality managers. When instead man-
agers can move across firms, firm-level coinsurance is no longer feasible, but
managers may self-insure by switching employer to delay the revelation of their
true quality. However this results in inefficient project assignment, with low-
quality managers handling projects that are too risky for them. (JEL D62,
G32, G38, J33)
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In the last few decades, the financial sector, and particularly investment banking,
has featured increasing competition for managerial talent. As argued by Morrison
and Wilhelm (2008), this development occurred in investment banking since the
increased importance of economies of scale associated with new technologies made
the partnership model obsolete, and induced investment banks to turn into corporate
entities and go public. While partnerships encouraged close relationships between
employees and posed a natural obstacle to their mobility, the greater transparency of
corporations facilitated the poaching of star employees and decreased their corporate
loyalty.1 This development also occurred in commercial banking, which once entailed
a great deal of local knowledge, so that over their careers bank managers developed
employer- and location-specific skills; today banking is much less local, owing to the
increasing role of large banks, greater distance between banks and customers, and
reliance on hard rather than soft information in lending (Petersen and Rajan, 2002,
and Berger, et al, 2005). In fact, an increase in managerial mobility occurred even
beyond the boundaries of the financial industry, as witnessed by the historical trend
towards outside CEO appointments (Huson, Parrino and Starks, 2001): in 1940-67,
70 percent of top U.S. executives worked for the same company throughout their
careers, while in 1990-2003 their fraction was only 30 percent of the total (Frydman,
2007).
Most of the academic and media attention has focused on the spectacular growth
of financial managers’ pay associated with this increase in the competition for their
talent, and on the resulting increase in income inequality (Philippon and Reshef,
2012, and Bell and van Reenen, 2013). In this paper, we argue that, beside its
effect on income distribution, competition for managerial talent may also lead to
misallocation of talent by hampering employers’ ability to learn the true skills of
1As argued by Smith (2009), “in time there was significant erosion of the simple principles of
the partnership days. [...] Competition for talent made recruitment and retention more difficult
and thus tilted negotiating power further in favor of stars. [...] You had to pay everyone well
because you never knew what next year would bring, and because there was always someone trying
to poach your best trained people, whom you didn’t want to lose even if they were not superstars.
Consequently, bonuses in general became more automatic and less tied to superior performance.”
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bankers, traders and managers.
We make this point in a setting where managers are risk-averse while risk-neutral
firms compete for scarce managerial talent. We model managerial talent as “alpha”,
the ability to generate high returns without incurring high risks: lacking such talent,
managers can generate high returns only by exposing their firm to the risk of corre-
spondingly high losses. But risk only materializes in the long run, so talent can be
identified with certainty only if the managers entrusted with skill-sensitive projects
stay with their employer long enough. If they leave earlier, it may be impossible to
identify their contribution to the long-term performance of their projects.
In this setting, if managers were bound to their employer, then over time firms
could determine which managers are talented, and so could also insure managers
against the risk of being found to be untalented. There would therefore be two
efficiency gains. First, efficient allocation of investment projects to managers: when
managers’ skills are known, they can be assigned to the project they are best suited
to manage. Second, efficient risk-sharing: managers who prove to be low-skill can be
cross-subsidized at the expense of the more talented.
However, competition for managers can prevent both of these gains. If firms
compete aggressively (“seeking alpha”), then managers can leave before the long-
term risks associated with their projects materialize. Hence, the managers who are
discovered to be high-alpha types will extract all rents from their firms by generating
competitive offers that reward their talent, and so prevent firms from subsidizing
low-alpha managers. Thus if the labor market is competitive, managers face skewed
performance rewards once their types are revealed: high-alpha types extract all rents
and low-alpha types get no subsidy. Now, if firms assign managers of unknown
quality to skill-sensitive projects (which they will do if on average such projects
outperform alternative projects by a large enough margin), then managers have the
incentive to move to another firm before the risk materializes. There, they will
replicate the same behavior. In the aggregate, many managers will churn from one
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firm to the next, being assigned to skill-sensitive projects regardless of their true
“alpha”, i.e., their ability to avoid the implied risks. Talented executives will be
identified only in the long run: as managers proceed in their careers, their true quality
gradually emerges anyway, so that their incentive to churn decreases. The end result
is that competition for managers lowers efficiency: since types are not revealed quickly
enough, the efficient allocation of managers to projects is delayed and too many
projects fail; too many skill-sensitive projects are assigned to untalented managers
compared to the case where the managerial labor market features no mobility.
The result is reminiscent of Rajan (2005), one of the first to warn of excessive
risk-taking in financial institutions driven by “fake alpha”. In our model, fake alpha
is identified slowly because when job churning is possible, competition for managerial
talent induces a negative externality: every firm effectively offers an “escape route” to
the others’ employees, thus slowing down learning of true alpha and the assignment
of skill-sensitive projects to the few managers who can competently manage theirs
risks, as well as preventing efficient insurance of low-alpha managers against their
human capital risk.
When the model is extended to the infinite horizon case, it produces potentially
testable predictions regarding the correlation between managerial reputation and
mobility. Mobility is positively autocorrelated, and decreases over a manager’s career,
as information about the manager’s ability becomes sharper over time. Specifically,
if alpha is sufficiently rare, managers churn from firm to firm only if their reputation
lies in an intermediate range: once it exceeds a certain ceiling or falls below a floor,
they stop churning. If instead alpha is sufficiently widespread, managers prefer not
to churn across employers.
The model generates several further results. First, since the benefit of churning
is to delay the revelation of a manager’s true quality, a key parameter in the model
is the sensitivity of project performance to the manager’s quality: the lower such
sensitivity, the better the manager can cover his tracks, and thus the greater the
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insurance benefit from churning. But by the same token, the greater the implied
sacrifice of productive efficiency, which requires early learning of managers’ quality.
Second, the more risk-averse managers are, the stronger will be their incentive to
churn across employers to benefit from the implied insurance, and thus the more
likely that untalented managers are assigned to skill-sensitive projects: ironically,
greater risk aversion by managers entails greater risk for society. Third, even though
managers’ mobility would be lower if firms made their compensation conditional on
the actual project payoff or on the manager’s decision to leave the firm, firms have
no incentive to condition managerial compensation on these outcomes if the labor
market is competitive. Fourth, frictions in the market for managers (e.g. search
costs) and asymmetric information about the manager’s quality can actually mitigate
inefficiency by reducing managerial churning. Finally, we allow mobility to improve
the efficiency of the match between firms and managers, and show that this benefit
may outweigh the efficiency costs highlighted by the baseline model.
To summarize, competition in the market for managers generates an inefficiency
due to the contractual externality among firms. The financial sector appears to fit our
model particularly well since trading and sales skills are highly fungible, prompting
firms to compete keenly for “alpha”. And many financial sector products, from
mortgage-backed securities to credit default swaps or longevity insurance, have the
feature of earning a carry (interest or insurance premium) in the short run but with
potential long-run risks (default or longevity). While there are other explanations
for excess risk-taking, e.g., government guarantees for the financial sector without
proper risk controls, our model may help explain why it occurred even in parts of the
financial sector, such as investment banks and insurance, that were not apparently
entitled to government guarantees, explicit or implicit.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses the literature. Section
2 describes the overall setting. In Section 3 we analyze the two-period version of
the model, solve for the equilibrium in the non-competitive and in the competitive
labor market regime, and compare their efficiency properties. Section 4 analyzes the
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infinite-horizon version of the model. In Section 5 we relax several of our assumptions.
Section 6 concludes with a brief description of the model’s policy implications. The
proofs are in the Appendix.
1 Literature
Our model of the labor market is close to that by Harris and Holmstrom (1982).
Workers are long-lived and their productivity is uncertain. Because workers are risk-
averse and firms are risk-neutral, the first-best is for firms to fully insure workers and
pay a constant wage; but, as noted by Harris and Holmstrom, full insurance is not
feasible if there is labor market competition and worker mobility. The reason is that
under full insurance, workers who turn out to be very productive will be paid less
than their marginal product. So competing firms will want to hire them, leaving the
original firm with only low-productivity workers.
With respect to this framework, our paper introduces two novel elements: a
project choice by firms, and a decision to move by managers. The choice of projects
allows the firm to control whether types can become observable: the managers’ type
becomes known only if they are assigned to a skill-sensitive project, unless the em-
ployee moves to another firm before the project’s payoff becomes known. Alterna-
tively, employers can assign managers to projects whose payoff is not skill-sensitive,
hence solving the Harris-Holmstrom problem: insofar as productivity shocks are hid-
den, full insurance becomes possible. But this insurance comes at a cost, since know-
ing a worker’s productivity is useful in selecting the most suitable project for him.
Hence, our model features a trade-off between the two information effects discussed
in Hirshleifer (1971): information revelation has a cost (destroying insurance possi-
bilities) but also a benefit (enhancing production efficiency). However, in our model
the firm considers only the efficiency benefit in assigning workers to projects: if a
worker stays on for more than one period, the employer learns his type and thereafter
assigns him to skill-sensitive, high-yield projects if he is good or to talent-insensitive,
– 5 –
low-yield projects otherwise. Thus if a worker wants to delay the revelation of his
type, he will try to churn across firms. Such mobility provides insurance, but also
produces inefficiency in worker-project matching.
Our results represent a countervailing force to the benefits arising from competi-
tive labor markets through efficient matching. A vast literature in labor economics,
starting with Jovanovic (1979), highlights the benefits of mobility to achieve efficient
matches between employees and employers, on the assumption that job matches are
experience goods. In our setting instead, mobility results in less efficient matching
of managers to projects within each firm.
The fact that competition for scarce talent in our model introduces an externality
in wage setting is reminiscent of the corporate governance externalities formalized by
Acharya and Volpin (2009) and Dicks (2012). In these models, competition prompts
firms to incentivize managers via higher salaries rather than better governance. In
the same spirit, Thanassoulis (2012) shows that competition for bank executives
generates a negative externality, driving up remuneration and hence increasing rival
banks’ default risk. In contrast to these studies on governance externalities, our
paper posits a dynamic setting in which firms can learn about their employees and
assign them to the right tasks, but such learning is hampered by managers’ ability
to generate offers from other firms before their type is revealed.
Labor market competition may also lead companies to rely too heavily on high-
powered incentives, shifting effort away from the less easily contractible tasks, such as
risk management, towards the contractible ones. This point is captured by Be´nabou
and Tirole (2016), in a multitasking model where workers differ in productivity in
a rewardable task and in willingness to perform an unrewarded one (work ethic).
When firms compete for workers, they use incentive pay also to attract or retain the
most productive workers, and by doing so they reduce work ethic below the social
optimum. Our model is complementary to that by Be´nabou and Tirole: we focus
on employees’ firm-level insurance and on how labor-market competition, by eroding
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such insurance, leads to churning as an alternative way of synthesizing insurance;
in contrast, they focus on multi-tasking and on how competition reduces effort in
non-contractible tasks.
Finally, competition for talent may hinder firms’ ability to discipline managers,
generating inefficient executive compensation in settings with moral hazard. Axelson
and Bond (2015) show that smart workers may be “too hard to manage”, because
their high outside options make them insensitive to the threat of dismissal. Makarov
and Plantin (2015) develop a model of active portfolio management in which fund
managers may secretly gamble in order to raise their reputation and attract invest-
ment, with trading strategies that expose investors to severe losses. Our analysis
differs from these models insofar as excess risk-taking arises not from moral hazard
but from inefficiently slow learning of employees’ skills.
2 Setting
There are K identical profit-maximizing firms, indexed by k = 1, ..., K, owned by
risk-neutral shareholders. Each firm employs I risk-averse managers. So managers
are indexed by i = 1, ..., I ×K. Both K and I are large: firms behave competitively,
and each employs a large number of managers. Firms and managers have the same
time horizon. Each manager i maximizes the discounted expected utility of future
wages, conditional on current information:
Vit = Et
[
T−1∑
s=0
ρsu(wit+s)
]
, (1)
where u(wit+s) is the utility of the wage wit+s received in period t+s, ρ is the discount
factor, Et [·] is the expectation conditional on the information available in period t,
and T is the time horizon. In the simplest and most intuitive case, analyzed in
Section 3, managers and firms have a two-period horizon (T = 2); Section 4 extends
the analysis to the infinite-horizon case; and Section 5 contains extensions of the
2-period model. In all variants, u(·) is increasing and concave: managers are risk-
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averse regarding their compensation. Moreover, they are born with no wealth and
are impatient (their discount factor ρ being smaller than the market interest rate
factor 1/(1 + r)), so that their consumption equals their wage at each date. Hence,
managers do not insure themselves by saving against shocks to the value of their
human capital due to changes in their reputation. This allows us to focus on the firm
and on mobility across firms as the only sources of insurance against these shocks.2
Each firm can make its compensation conditional on the projects assigned to the
manager and on past information about the manager. The results would not be
affected if the firm could make pay conditional also (i) on the actual payoff of the
project assigned to the manager or (ii) on the manager’s decision to resign and leave
the firm. In both cases, in equilibrium firms will not make pay conditional on these
additional outcomes, as shown in Section 5.2.
2.1 Projects and managers
Each manager can run a new project per period. The project produces its payoff
at the end of the period. Managers are not all equally good: a fraction p ∈ (0, 1)
are high-quality managers, and a fraction 1 − p of them are low-quality. Moreover,
high-quality managers are relatively scarce: p ≤ 1/2. Initially, the manager i does
not know his own quality qi = {H,L}. Manager i starts working at any firm k and
can move to another firm j before the project initiated in that period pays off.
Project payoffs are affected by two sources of risk: technological risk and manage-
rial talent uncertainty. Some projects are exposed to both risks because the managers
in charge of them have a degree of discretion, so that their skill affects the projects’
outcome: we label these α projects, to stress that their payoff is sensitive to the pres-
ence or absence of managerial “alpha”. Other projects feature purely technological
risk: we refer to them as β projects.
2The impact of these shocks on consumption cannot be softened by borrowing either: the shocks
that we analyze are not transitory ones, since they refer to the value of managers’ human capital.
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Technological risk is firm-specific and diversifiable: it is captured by a random
variable y˜k affecting the payoff of all firm k’s projects, and is drawn from the same
distribution for all firms, with mean y > 0 .3 The payoff of β projects undertaken in
firm k is yβ = y˜k, that is, reflects only its technological risk, not the manager’s skills:
if assigned to such projects, managers have zero alpha, irrespective of their talent.
In contrast, the α projects of firm k produce positive alpha in the hands of good
managers, and negative alpha in the hands of bad ones: in the first case, their payoff
yα is y˜k + (y − y); in the second, it is y˜k + (y − c− y), where y − y > 0 > y − c− y.
Hence, when benchmarked against β projects in the same firm, α projects yield an
extra gain y− y > 0 when entrusted to good managers and a loss y− c− y < 0 when
entrusted to bad ones.4 This difference is illustrated in the upper panel of Figure 1.
Hence both projects are risky, but only the risk of α projects is affected by man-
agerial talent. Conditioning on the manager’s quality, the payoffs of α projects are
identical to those of project β up to a positive or negative constant, while uncondi-
tionally they are a lottery that adds managerial risk to the payoffs of project β. So
if the manager’s type is uncertain, α projects feature both managerial quality risk
and technological risk, while β projects feature only the latter. These assumptions
imply that α projects are riskier than β projects. Yet this feature is inessential to
our analysis: the results of the model would be unaffected if β projects were riskier
than α projects due to greater technological risk.5 What matters is that learning
about manager quality reduces the risk of mistakes in the assignment of α projects,
thus raising their expected payoff, while it does not affect the payoff of β projects.
3Hence firms are assumed to be homogeneous in their average efficiency: an extension that allows
for heterogeneous firms is presented in Subsection 5.5.
4Project α can be interpreted as a carry trade, which yields profit y if closed in time. The skilled
trader closes it in time; the unskilled trader, who does not know when to close, incurs a cost c.
5For instance, the model’s results would be the same if firm k’s β projects were to yield yβ =
y˜k + ε˜k, where ε˜k is an additional zero-mean technological shock such that var(yβ) > var(yα),
provided the realizations of ε˜k can be disentangled from those of y˜k (being drawn from a different
distribution or being common knowledge). If so, the firm could still learn the quality of the managers
in charge of its α projects by benchmarking their payoff yα against the payoff yβ of its β projects.
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[Figure 1: Expected payoffs of project α]
A key assumption is that if a manager initiates a project of type α, his ability
becomes perfectly known only if he remains in charge of it until the project pays
off, that is, until the end of the corresponding period. If the manager leaves before
the end of the period, the outcome of the project will reflect not only the manager’s
quality but also some noise, due to the fact that the project is no longer monitored by
its initiator after his departure. This captures the idea that it takes time to determine
a person’s ability to manage such a project.
This assumption is illustrated in the lower panel of Figure 1: if the manager does
not complete the project, with probability λ the project’s expected payoff will reflect
his type (y if the manager is good, and y−c if he is bad), and with probability 1−λ a
noise factor that will make the project succeed (i.e., produce y) with probability p, the
same as if the initiator were randomly drawn from the managers’ population. Hence,
when noise intervenes the project’s outcome is uninformative about the quality of
its initiator. But the noise factor does not per se change the expected payoff of the
project: as can be seen in Figure 1, even when the project is not completed by its
initiator, project α succeeds with probability p and fails with probability 1− p.
To summarize, the payoff of project α depends both on the manager’s type and on
whether the manager stays or leaves. Defining the manager i’s type by the indicator
Ii = 1[qi=H] (equal to 1 if qi = H and 0 if qi = L), α projects completed by manager
i yield the following differential payoffs compared to β projects in the same firm:6
yα − y˜ =
{
y − y > 0 if Ii = 1,
y − c− y < 0 if Ii = 0.
(2)
Instead, if left unfinished by manager i, α projects yield a differential payoff:
yα − y˜ =
{
y − y > 0 with probability pi,
y − c− y < 0 with probability 1− pi,
(3)
6Notice that, since these expressions are the same for all firms, for notational simplicity we have
dropped the firm’s subscript k from the realized payoff y˜k: even though each firm has different
realizations of the technological shock, these affect equally all of its projects.
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where the probability of success pi is
pi = λIi + (1− λ)p =
{
λ+ (1− λ)p if Ii = 1,
(1− λ)p if Ii = 0.
(4)
Recall that if the manager leaves project α unfinished, the success probability pi
reflects his true quality (captured by the indicator function Ii) with probability λ
and the noise factor with probability 1− λ. Hence, λ is the sensitivity of the project
to its initiator’s quality, or equivalently the informativeness of its outcome about the
departed manager’s quality. In the limiting case where λ = 1, the project always
succeeds if initiated by a good manager and fails otherwise, so that its outcome is
perfectly informative. In the polar opposite case where λ = 0, the project succeeds
with the unconditional probability (pi = p), irrespective of its initiator’s quality.
The relative expected profitability of the two projects is assumed to satisfy the
following condition:
y − (1− p)c > y > y − c. (5)
The left-hand side inequality indicates that, if the manager is of unknown quality, the
expected payoff of project α exceeds that of project β : hence, on average managerial
skills generate value – an assumption that will be relaxed in one of the extensions of
the model. The right-hand side inequality states that, if the manager is bad, project
β yields a greater expected return than project α. Assumption (5) implies that it is
optimal to assign bad managers only to β projects, and good ones only to α projects:
assigning bad managers to α projects would destroy value.
To characterize the difference between the two projects, it is convenient to define
the variable η ≡ (y−y)/c: y−y is the excess return that a good manager can generate
if assigned to project α rather than β, while c = y − (y − c) is the range of payoffs
that project α produces in the hands of a good and a bad manager. Hence, we will
refer to η as a measure of the risk-adjusted efficiency gain of project α compared to
project β. Assumption (5) can thus be rewritten as:
1− p < η < 1. (6)
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Another way of stating this assumption is that the probability p of finding a good
manager must be large enough (i.e., exceed 1− η) as to induce firms to learn about
managers’ skills by assigning them to project α, and the project α should not be
so efficient (i.e., η < 1) as to make it optimal for all types. Since we also assumed
“alpha” to be an uncommon quality, the probability of a good manager must be
p ∈ (1− η, 1/2). We extend the analysis to the case p < (1− η) in Section 5.1.
2.2 Market for managerial talent
We posit that in each period the pool of projects available to a firm includes at least
one α and one β project per manager. Therefore, managers – not projects – are the
scarce factor of production, since only managers can start a new project.
At the beginning of any period t, the firm decides whether to make an offer to
the manager, who can accept or reject it. The offer consists of a sequence of wages
{wikτ}τ=Tτ=t , where T is the maximum number of periods of employment. Being paid
in advance, at the beginning of the relevant period, each wage wikτ reflects manager
i’s expected productivity in period τ , and therefore is contingent on the project Pikτ
to which he will be assigned in period τ and on his perceived quality θiτ−1 ∈ [0, 1]
conditional on the information available up to period τ − 1:
wikτ = w (Pikτ , θiτ−1) , (7)
where Pikτ ∈ {α, β} indicates whether manager i is assigned to project α or β in
period τ . Since the belief θiτ−1 about the manager’s quality evolves on the basis
of his performance, the contract is effectively contingent on the payoffs of the past
projects run by the manager at firm k and at previous employers. In the baseline
version of the model, the period-τ wage cannot be contingent on the manager’s
decision to stay or leave the firm before the end of period τ : the maximum penalty
for resignation is receiving no further wage payments from one’s former employer.
As already mentioned, this assumption is with no loss of generality (see Section 5).
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A firm’s strategy is a profit-maximizing choice of wage offers and project assign-
ments. More precisely, the firm chooses its offer {wikτ}τ=Tτ=t to each manager i and,
upon hiring him, assigns him to project Pikt ∈ {α, β}, so as to maximize its expected
revenue, conditional on the belief θit−1:
pi(Pikt|θit−1) =
{
y − (1− θit−1)c if Pikt = α,
y if Pikt = β.
(8)
Firms commit to pay the sequence of wages that they have offered, but not to a
specific project assignment: once the contract is agreed upon, the firm assigns the
manager to whatever project Pikt maximizes its expected profits. However, as we
shall see, in equilibrium firms pick the most appealing projects from the managers’
viewpoint (i.e., those yielding wages that maximize their expected utility), due to
ex-ante competition and symmetric information. Therefore, even if the choice of
projects were entrusted to managers, they would pick the same projects as firms.
The assumption that firms, rather than managers, pick projects is irrelevant in our
model, which features perfect congruence between their objectives.
The manager’s strategy consists of a period-by-period choice of employer: man-
ager i employed by firm k in period t will choose whether to keep working at firm k
or switch to a new employer in period t+ 1 as a function of the belief θit−1 about his
quality, so as to maximize the expected utility (1) from his compensation.
We assume that in offering wage contracts, firms bid competitively for managers,
anticipating their future performance: hence, managers extract all of the expected
profit that they generate with an employer. But, while ex ante there is perfect com-
petition for managerial talent, switching costs may prevent it ex post : over time,
managers may make firm-specific investments or develop location-specific tastes, im-
peding poaching by other firms. To bring out the implications of ex-post competition
for managerial talent, in the baseline model we focus on the two polar cases where
switching costs are either prohibitively high – the “competitive” regime – or absent
– the “non-competitive” regime. In an extension, we consider the intermediate case
of a managerial labor market with some frictions in the form of switching costs.
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In the non-competitive regime, once a manager accepts a firm’s initial offer, he
can no longer leave. In the competitive regime, at the start of each period a manager
chooses whether or not to leave his current employer. When indifferent, he is assumed
to stay – a tie-breaking rule that reflects the presence of an arbitrarily small switching
cost even in the competitive regime.
In both regimes, managerial performance is publicly observable: if a manager’s
ability becomes known to the current employer, it is also known to other firms. This
assumption is not essential in our context, however. To see why, suppose that a man-
ager’s performance is visible only to his current employer. Then, in the competitive
regime a manager who turned out to be good could move to another firm and, if
assigned to project α, would want to stay there for a whole period, to allow the new
employer to verify his talent. So even if the manager’s performance were not publicly
observed, outside offers would be effectively conditioned on his true type, once this
has become known to the manager.
2.3 Time line
Assuming without loss of generality that the representative manager i is employed
in all periods, the sequence of his actions in a typical period t is as follows:
(i) At the start of period t, manager i accepts an offer from firm k (or renegotiates
his previous contract with firm k), which assigns him to project Pikt ∈ {α, β}.
(ii) Before completion of the project, the manager chooses whether to stay with
employer k also in period t+ 1 or leave.
(iii) Project Pikt is completed and produces its payoff yikt. If Pikt = β, the
observed payoff is y˜kt. If Pikt = α and manager i stays, the project’s excess payoff
yikt− y˜kt over the observed payoff of β projects in firm k reveals manager i’s quality,
by (2); if instead he leaves, the project proceeds unsupervised, so that its excess
payoff yikt − y˜kt is a noisy signal of the manager’s quality, by (3).
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(iv) At the end of period t, the belief θit that his quality is high (qi = H) is
updated on the basis of the available information.
(v) In any subsequent period, the sequence of moves is the same as in (i), (ii) and
(iii), with appropriate changes in the firm and time indices.
3 Two-period model
Some of the key results of the model can be obtained in a simple two-period setting.
In this case, manager i’s expected utility (1) reduces to Vi1 =E0 [u(wi1) + ρu(wi2)].
As mentioned in Section 2.2, we compare two regimes: a competitive labor market
where managers can freely move between firms at the end of period 1, and a non-
competitive one where they cannot, and thus effectively commit to work in the same
firm in both periods. As the critical difference between the two regimes is how much
firms learn about managers’ quality, we start by characterizing this learning process.
3.1 Evolution of beliefs about managerial quality
At the beginning of his career, the manager’s quality is unknown: he is good with
probability p and bad with probability 1−p. Hence, the prior belief that manager i’s
quality is high (qi = H) is θi0 = p. At the end of period 1, this belief is updated to θi1
on the basis of the manager’s performance, depending on whether he was assigned
to project α or β, and on whether he has chosen to stay with his employer until
completion of the project or not.
Specifically, if in period 1 manager i is assigned to project β (Pik1 = β), there is
no updating, as the project’s payoff is independent of i’s quality: θi1 = θi0 = p. If
instead the manager is assigned to project α (Pik1 = α) and stays until completion
of the project, his payoff yik1 can be benchmarked against the current realization y˜k1
of project β’s payoff. The difference between the two payoffs reveals his quality, as
shown by in (2), and all players update their beliefs accordingly: if yik1− y˜k1 = y−y,
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manager i is revealed to be good, so that θi1 = 1; if yik1 − y˜k1 = y − c − y, he is
revealed to be bad, so that θi1 = 0. Finally, if the manager is assigned to project α
but leaves before the project is completed, beliefs are updated using Bayes’ rule:7
θi1 =
{
θH = λ+ (1− λ)p > p = θi0 if yik1 − y˜k1 = y − y,
θL = (1− λ)p < p = θi0 if yik1 − y˜k1 = y − c− y.
(9)
Since θH > p, after a high excess payoff (y−y), the belief that the manager is good is
revised upwards (θi1 > θi0), the more so the greater is the sensitivity of the project’s
payoff to managerial quality (λ). Symmetrically, since θL < p, after a low excess
payoff (y − c− y) the belief is revised downwards (θi1 < θi0).
3.2 Non-competitive labor market
When there is no ex-post mobility of managers, any initial hire is expected to stay
both in period 1 and 2. Therefore any firm k will offer to manager i the wages
(wik1, wik2) that maximize the present discounted value of its two-period profits:
E0
[
pi(Pik1|θi0)− wik1 + 1
1 + r
(pi(Pik2|θi1)− wik2)
]
. (10)
Since firms are risk neutral, compete initially for managers and employ a large number
of them, they will bid wages up to the point where they earn zero expected profits:
wik1 = E0 [pi(Pik1|θi0)] , wik2 = E0 [pi(Pik2|θi1)] . (11)
Hence, the equilibrium lifetime wage of manager i is the revenue he is expected to
generate over his entire career at firm k. By symmetry, all firms pay an identi-
cal lifetime wage, implying that managers are indifferent between them. Moreover,
7Looking at Figure 1, one can easily compute the probabilities of the manager’s type being good
conditional on the two observed outcomes of the risky project:
θH ≡ Pr(qi = G|yik1 − y˜k1 = y − y) = pλ+ p
2(1− λ)
pλ+ p2(1− λ) + p(1− p)(1− λ) = λ+ (1− λ)p,
θL ≡ Pr(qi = G|yik1 − y˜k1 = y − c− y) = p(1− p)(1− λ)
(1− p)λ+ (1− p)2(1− λ) + p(1− p)(1− λ) = (1− β)p.
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managers are perfectly insured against the risk arising from their unknown quality:
equation (11) implies that good managers subsidize bad ones.
Even though firm k does not know its managers’ quality when it sets wages, it
anticipates that in choosing the period-2 project, Pik2, it will be able to condition on
the true manager’s quality. This is because, under assumption (5), it is optimal to
assign the manager to project α in period 1 (Pik1 = α), and since the manager will
stay until the completion of this project his quality will be known by the beginning
of period 2: θi1 = qi. Hence, in period 2 the firm will optimally assign project α to
good managers and project β to bad ones. This yields expected revenues:
E0 [pi(Pik1|p)] = y − (1− p)c, E0 [pi(Pik2|qi)] = py + (1− p)y, (12)
where the first expression is the expected revenue of project α undertaken in period 1
by a manager of unknown type, and the second is the expected continuation revenue
produced by the two (known) types in period 2, weighted by their frequencies.
Substituting (11) and (12) in (1) yields the manager’s expected utility level:
Vi0 = E0 [u(wi1) + ρu(wi2)] = u(y − (1− p)c) + ρu(py + (1− p)y). (13)
This equilibrium outcome features both (i) optimal risk-sharing, i.e., complete in-
surance of managers by firms; and (ii) productive efficiency, i.e., optimal assignment
of projects to managers. So in the non-competitive regime, the managers’ expected
utility is maximal:
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium under no competition) Without ex-post competi-
tion for managers, the first-best outcome is attained in equilibrium.
3.3 Competitive labor market
The regime where managers are free to move between firms at the end of period 1 is
illustrated by the time line in Figure 2.
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[Figure 2: Time line of the 2-period model]
In period 1, the manager’s type is unknown: when he is assigned to the period-1
project the belief about his quality is the unconditional probability θi0 = p. His
decision to stay with firm k or move to another firm h before the completion of the
period-1 project does not affect the expected payoff of the project, but does affect
how much is learnt about his type: if manager i assigned to project α stays with the
initial employer k until the project pays off, his type qi is perfectly learnt; if i leaves
before the end of period 1, the updating is described by (9).
We solve the model by backward induction starting from the firm’s choice of
project in period 2. Since in that period the manager may be employed by firm k or
h (depending on the manager’s choice to stay or leave), for simplicity we drop the
firm’s subscript from the project assigned to manager i and from his wage.
3.3.1 Firm’s project choice in period 2
The firm employing manager i in period 2 will assign him to the project that maxi-
mizes its profit pi(Pi2|θi1) in (8), which depends on the manager’s reputation θi1:
Pi2 =
{
α if η ≥ 1− θi1,
β if η < 1− θi1.
The manager will be assigned to project α only if his reputation is sufficiently good, so
that the risk-adjusted efficiency gain η of project α exceeds the conditional probability
of the manager being bad, 1− θi1. Owing to competition, the wage paid to manager
i in period 2 equals his expected productivity:
wi2 =
{
y − (1− θi1)c if Pi2 = α
y if Pi2 = β
(14)
Notice that in period 1 the manager i, being of unknown quality, must have been
assigned to project α (Pi1 = α), by assumption (5). Depending on the project’s
payoff and manager’s decision to stay or leave in period 1, his reputation θi1 will take
one of four possible values:
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(i) θ = 1 if manager i stayed and the project’s excess payoff was y − y;
(ii) θ = θH if manager i moved and the project’s excess payoff was y − y;
(iii) θ = θL if manager i moved and the project’s excess payoff was y− c− y; and,
(iv) θ = 0 if manager i stayed and the project’s excess payoff was y − c− y.
The choice of projects in period 2 is as follows:
Lemma 1 There are two cases to consider:
1. if η ≥ 1− θL, then Pi2 =
{
α if θ ∈ {1, θH , θL},
β otherwise;.
2. if η < 1− θL, then Pi2 =
{
α if θ ∈ {1, θH},
β otherwise.
3.3.2 Manager’s decision to move or stay
We proceed backwards to the manager’s period-1 decision whether to stay with the
current employer (firm k) or to move to firm j. If the manager stays, his period-2
wage wi2 will equal y if he is found to be a good type (qi1 = G), which happens
with probability p; or y if he is found to be a bad type (qi1 = B), which occurs with
probability 1− p. Hence, his expected continuation utility is
pu(y) + (1− p)u(y). (15)
If he moves, his reputation will be θH if project Pik1 succeeds, and θL if it fails.
From Lemma 1, a manager with reputation θH is always assigned to project α in
period 2; one with reputation θL is assigned to project α only if η ≥ 1− θL. Hence:
1. if η ≥ 1− θL, then the expected utility from moving is:
pu (y − (1− θH)c) + (1− p)u (y − (1− θL)c) (16)
2. if η < 1− θL, then the expected utility from moving is:
pu (y − (1− θH)c) + (1− p)u(y) (17)
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Comparing the continuation payoffs from moving and staying, one obtains:
Proposition 2 (Decision to move in period 1) Manager i switches firm at the
end of period 1 if and only if
(1− p) [u (y − (1− θL)c)− u(y)] ≥ p [u(y)− u (y − (1− θH)c)] , (18)
where θH ≡ λ+ (1− λ)p and θL ≡ (1− λ)p.
Switching firms before the project terminates provides insurance to the manager,
in the form of a less variable continuation wage: instead of the payoffs y and y,
the manager receives the less extreme payoffs y − (1 − θH)c and y − (1 − θL)c, as
y > y − (1 − θH)c > y − (1 − θL)c ≥ y. By moving, the manager trades a wage
reduction (1 − θH)c in the state in which his type is good with a wage increase in
the state in which it is bad (y − (1 − θL)c − y). The manager decides to move only
when the expected benefit if he is good exceeds the expected cost if it is bad. But
this insurance comes at the cost of a lower expected wage, because a manager who
does not move – being of known quality – is always assigned efficiently (to project
α if good and to project β if bad), while a manager who moves may be assigned
inefficiently (to project α even if he is actually bad). This expected efficiency loss is
an increasing function of the frequency of bad managers (1−p), since these managers
are inappropriately assigned to project α when they move.
Hence, the choice between moving and staying involves a trade-off between the
insurance benefit of mobility and its efficiency cost. The manager’s risk aversion is
therefore the key parameter in the decision to move: managers prefer mobility if they
are sufficiently risk averse. Indeed, if they were risk neutral, they would choose not
to move: by moving, they would suffer a reduction in the expected wage, but they
would not value the implied insurance.
The trade-off is also affected by other parameters, besides risk aversion. Mobility
is more attractive if η is high, i.e., if project α is much more efficient than project
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β, even considering the losses from assigning it to bad managers. Conversely, an
increase in the sensitivity of project α to its initiator’s quality, λ, makes mobility less
attractive: intuitively, when project α’s payoff is very informative about its initiator’s
talent even when he does not complete it, moving does not allow him to cover his
track, and therefore provides little insurance.
We can characterize the decision to move in period 1 as follows:
Proposition 3 (Characterizing the decision to move) (i) If a manager moves,
his period-2 wage has lower mean and lower variance than if he does not. (ii) The
expected gain from moving is increasing in the efficiency gain (η) from project α, and
is decreasing in the informativeness of project α’s payoff (λ). (iii) The expected gain
from moving is increasing in the manager’s risk aversion.
Interestingly, in the proof of this proposition the assumption p ≤ 1/2 guarantees
that greater risk aversion makes mobility more attractive: intuitively, when “alpha”
is not widespread, each manager will worry about not being one of the talented few,
and therefore an increase in his risk aversion will lead him to value mobility more. As
risk aversion increases, the trade-off gradually tilts in favor of managerial mobility,
since the reduction in the variance of future compensation gets an increasing weight
compared to the reduction of its expected value.
[Figure 3: Moving decision and risk aversion in the 2-period model]
To illustrate this point, in Figure 3 we assume constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) utility u(w2) = (w
1−γ
2 − 1)/(1 − γ), and vary risk aversion γ while holding
the other parameters fixed at y = 3, y = 1, c = 2.5, p = 0.4 and λ = 0.2. As can be
seen from the figure, moving dominates staying only if relative risk aversion γ exceeds
1.4. Ironically, as managers become more risk averse, society takes a greater amount
of risk, since when they move across firms they are all assigned to the project α:
mobility gives managers insurance, at the cost of greater risk taking for the economy.
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To compute the expected utility of managers in the competitive labor market,
notice that the first-period wage of the manager is the same as in the non-competitive
case, i.e., the expected payoff from project α undertaken by a manager of unknown
quality: wi1 = y − (1− p)c. Substituting the implied expression for period-1 utility
and the continuation utilities (15), (16) and (17) in (1) yields the manager’s maximum
expected utility level:
Vi0 = u(y − (1− p)c) + ρmax {pu(y) + (1− p)u(y),
[pu(y − (1− θH)c) + (1− p) max (u(y), u(y − (1− θL)c))]} . (19)
3.4 Comparing labor market regimes
It is easy to see that the expected utility (19) achieved under competition is lower than
the first-best level (13) achieved if the labor market is not competitive: the period-1
utility, u(y−(1−p)c), is the same, while the period-2 expected utility is lower, because
without competition the manager obtains for sure the wage py+(1−p)y corresponding
to the expected profits with complete learning. This implies optimal risk sharing,
as the wage is not conditional on employees’ quality, even though in period 2 this
information is used to match managerial talent to projects. In other words, good
managers subsidize bad ones: this cross-subsidy is feasible only because in the non-
competitive regime good managers cannot leave for higher pay at other firms. Under
the assumption of ex-post competition maintained in Section 3.3, instead, this cross-
subsidization cannot be achieved, as any firm offering the wages (12) would lose all its
good managers in period 2 and hence make losses: once the true quality of managers
is known, other firms would offer the competitive wage wik2 = y to good managers,
outbidding the period-2 wage py+ (1− p)y in (12). Hence, a firm offering the wages
in (12) would be left only with overpaid low-quality managers in period 2. Therefore,
ex-post competition destroys risk sharing, as in Harris and Holmstrom (1982).
It is worth noticing that under competition the first-best outcome is unattainable
not only when in the competitive equilibrium managers move across companies ac-
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cording to Proposition 2, but also when they do not, condition (18) being violated:
also in that case, in equilibrium good managers are paid the period-2 wage wik2 = y
in line with their quality, because ex-post competition bids it to that level, even if
they do not move to another firm. So, even when a competitive labor market fea-
tures no mobility, optimal risk sharing cannot be achieved. But at least in that case
managers are efficiently allocated, since without mobility firms can learn their true
quality in period 1 and allocate them efficiently to projects in period 2. When instead
a competitive labor market features mobility, i.e., condition (18) holds, there is both
inefficient assignment of managers and incomplete risk sharing, even though mobility
provides some insurance compared to the case of no mobility. To summarize:
Proposition 4 (Inefficiency of the competitive labor market) The competi-
tive equilibrium features inefficient project assignment and partial risk-sharing if man-
agers move across firms, and efficient project assignment but no risk sharing if they
do not.
In principle, firms might constrain themselves to play the efficient, non competi-
tive equilibrium rather than the inefficient, competitive one, by signing no-compete
clauses with each other. The situation is akin to a “prisoner’s dilemma,” as no in-
dividual firm has the incentive to abstain from poaching other firm’s managers, but
social welfare would be higher if they all together credibly commit not to hire other
firms’ managers. This suggests that policies that “throw sand in the wheels” of ex-
post competition in the managerial market may increase welfare, effectively forcing
firms to behave as if they had signed a binding no-compete agreement. We will return
to the policy implications of the model in the conclusions.
4 Infinite-horizon model
As shown above, the analysis becomes quickly more complex if the manager’s hori-
zon increases while staying finite. This is because the decision problem faced by
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the manager is not stationary: as the number of periods increases, the number of
contingencies to be considered in previous decisions escalates. In contrast, when the
manager’s horizon becomes infinite, the problem is stationary, so that one can define
stationary cutoffs for the manager’s reputation that determine his decision to move
or stay. The key additional insight from this analysis is that mobility occurs only if
his reputation lies in an intermediate range: for extreme values of his reputation, the
insurance gain stemming from mobility is too low, because the information publicly
available about the manager’s ability is already quite precise – another instance of
the Hirshleifer effect.
If the horizon is infinite, in each period t the manager maximizes the expected
utility from his future wages conditional on his past reputation, that is, on the com-
mon belief about his quality as of period t− 1, θt−1:8
V (θt−1) = E
[ ∞∑
s=0
ρt+su(wt+s)|θt−1
]
= u(wt) + ρE [V (θt)|θt−1] , (20)
where in the second step the manager’s expected utility is shown in recursive form.
We analyze the model by considering a generic period t as described in Figure 4:
[Figure 4: Time line of the model with infinite horizon]
At the beginning of the period, the manager’s reputation coincides with the com-
mon belief about his quality θt−1. His current employer, firm k, assigns the manager
to project α or β. Before completing the project, the manager can move to firm j.
At the end of period t, the project’s excess payoff yt − y˜t = {y − c− y, 0, y − y} is
realized and the manager’s reputation is updated.
We proceed in three steps. First, we show has the manager’s reputation evolves
over time. Second, we consider which project the current employer assigns to the
manager at the beginning of period t, based on his reputation θt−1 (dropping the
8Recall that in each period the manager is assumed to consume all of his wage income, so that
his consumption equals his wage.
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manager’s index i to simplify notation). Third, we analyze his decision to stay
or move to a new firm, based on how this choice is expected to impact his future
reputation and continuation utility.
4.1 Manager’s reputation
At the end of any period t, the common belief θit that manager i’ s quality is high
(qi = H) is a sufficient statistic of manager i’s past employment history . In each
period t the belief θit is updated on the basis of the manager’s previous performance,
depending on whether he is assigned to project α or β, and on whether he has
ever chosen to stay with his employer for an entire period or not. As illustrated
by Section 3.1 with reference to the updating of beliefs in period 1, if manager i is
assigned to project β, there is no updating; if he is assigned to project α and stays
until completion of the project, the manager’s quality is revealed by his performance,
so that the belief is updated either to θi1 = 1 or to θi1 = 0; if instead the manager is
assigned to project α but leaves before the completion of the period-1 project, beliefs
are updated according to expression (9).
Now, suppose that also after period 1 manager i keeps moving across firms: the
in each subsequent period t the belief about his quality will keep being updated
according to Bayes’ rule. , As long as he moves across firms, the odds ratio θt/(1−θt)
of his type can be shown to evolve according to the following law of motion (dropping
the manager’s and firm’s subscripts to simplify notation):
θt
1− θt =
θt−1
1− θt−1 ×

1 + λ
(1−λ)p ≡ 1 + δ+ > 1 if yt − y˜t = y − y,
1 if yt − y˜t = 0,
1− λ
1−(1−λ)p ≡ 1− δ− < 1 if yt − y˜t = y − c− y.
(21)
where δ+ indicates the size of upward revisions of the ratio upon “good news” and
δ− the size of downward revisions of the ratio upon “bad news”. For instance, the
reputation of a manager whose first project did well improves if his second project
does well too, and deteriorates otherwise; symmetrically, the reputation of a manager
whose first project did badly improves if his second project does well, and deteriorates
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otherwise. The size of upward revisions δ+ is increasing in λ and decreasing in p: when
the manager leaves the firm, good news have a large positive impact on his reputation
if the project’s outcome is very sensitive to the manager’s quality (large λ), and if
the chance of a lucky outcome is low (small p). The size of downward revisions δ−
is also increasing in λ but is increasing in p: bad news have a large negative impact
on the manager’s reputation if the project’s outcome is very sensitive to his quality,
and if the chance of a lucky outcome is high.
By iterating expression (21), the odds ratio at any future date t + T is seen to
be increasing in the odds ratio in period t: denoting the number of upward and
downward revisions by U and D (where U +D = T ), respectively, we can write it as
θt+T
1− θt+T =
θt−1
1− θt−1 × (1 + δ
+)U × (1− δ−)D, (22)
so that manager’s future reputation θT+t is increasing in his current reputation θt−1.
Expression (21) can also be used to compute the law of motion of the manager’s
reputation itself:
θt =

θUt ≡ θt−1 × 1+δ
+
1+θt−1δ+
> θt−1 if yt − y˜t = y − y,
θt−1 if yt − y˜t = 0,
θDt ≡ θt−1 × 1−δ
−
1−θt−1δ− < θt−1 if yt − y˜t = y − c− y.
(23)
Hence, the manager’s reputation conditional on good news at t, θUit , is increasing
and concave in his past reputation θit−1: good news are less informative for already
reputable managers. Conditional upon receiving bad news at t, the manager’s repu-
tation, θDit , is increasing and convex in his past reputation θit−1: bad news are more
informative if they concern reputable managers.
4.2 Project choice
The project Pkt = {α, β} to which the manager is assigned by firm k depends on the
manager’s reputation as of the previous period, θt−1:
Pkt =
{
α if η ≥ 1− θt−1,
β if η < 1− θt−1.
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Because of perfect competition for managers, the manager is paid his expected pro-
ductivity:
wt =

y − (1− θt−1)c if Pkt = α and manager expected to stay at t,
y − [1− λθt−1 − (1− λ)p]c if Pkt = α and manager expected to move at t,
y if Pkt = β.
(24)
4.3 Manager’s decision to move or stay
When he takes his decision to move or stay in period t, the manager conditions on
his past reputation θt−1, but takes into account that his decision will affect his future
reputation θt.
If θt−1 < 1−η, he does not benefit from moving, since his current employer assigns
him to project β. Hence, by (23) his reputation remains unchanged: θt = θt−1.
If instead θt−1 ≥ 1 − η, the current employer decides to assign the manager to
project α, so that some updating of the manager’s reputation occurs by the end of
period t. Hence, in every period the manager can decide to delay learning about his
true quality: it is revealed if he stays, while it may not be if he moves.
Specifically, if the manager stays, his continuation utility is
θt−1VH + (1− θt−1)VL, (25)
where VH ≡ u(y)1−ρ and VL ≡ u(y)1−ρ are the present discounted utilities from being
identified as type H and a type L, respectively. As VH > VL, his continuation utility
from staying is strictly increasing in his past reputation θt−1.
If the manager moves instead, his continuation utility can be written as
[λθt−1 + (1− λ)p]V
(
θUt
)
+ [1− λθt−1 − (1− λ)p]V
(
θDt
)
. (26)
Hence, the manager’s utility in (20) must be rewritten taking into account that
his continuation utility takes two different forms depending on whether he stays or
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moves. It is the sum of the utility from consuming his current wage, u(wt), and the
discounted value of the maximum of the continuation utilities if he stays or moves:
V (θt−1) = u(wt) + ρmax{θt−1VH + (1− θt−1)VL, (27)
[λθt−1 + (1− λ)p]V
(
θt−1
1 + δ+
1 + θt−1δ+
)
+ [1− λθt−1 − (1− λ)p]V
(
θt−1
1− δ−
1− θt−1δ−
)
}.
To derive the manager’s optimal decision regarding moving or staying, it is useful to
characterize the function V (θ):
Lemma 2 The manager’s utility V (θ) is increasing in his reputation θ, and is
bounded between VL and VH .
Using these results, we can now establish the manager’s optimal stopping rule:
Proposition 5 (Manager’s reputation and mobility) Define the upper and
lower bounds for the manager’s reputation:
θ =
[λθ + (1− λ)p][V
(
θ(1+δ+)
1+θδ+
)
− VL]
VH − VL
and
θ =
[1− λθ − (1− λ)p][V
(
θ(1−δ−)
1−θδ−
)
− VL](1 + θδ+)
(VH − VL){(1 + θδ+)− [λθ + (1− λ)p](1 + δ+)}
,
where 0 < θ < p and θ ∈ (0, 1]. Then, if p ≤ θ, the manager moves in period t if and
only if θt−1 ∈ [θ, θ]; if p > θ, the manager never moves.
Hence, if the probability of being a good manager is sufficiently low (p ≤ θ),
i.e., if “alpha” is sufficiently rare, the manager chooses to buy insurance by moving
across firms only when his reputation has “intermediate” values, namely falls in the
interval (θ, θ). Intuitively, when his reputation drops to the lower bound θ, he stops
moving because the wage that he would get by moving to a new firm is close to the
wage that he would get if he stays with his current employer and is revealed as a
bad type: hence, the insurance gain from moving is too modest compared with the
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implied inefficiency in project assignment, a result already found in the two-period
model. When instead the manager’s reputation rises to the upper bound θ, he stops
moving because he is sufficiently likely to be revealed as a good type, so that the
wage that he can expect if his true quality is revealed is likely to be the high wage y:
also in this case, the insurance gain from moving is too modest compared with the
implied inefficiency in project assignment.
If instead the probability of being a good manager is sufficiently high (p > θ),
i.e., if “alpha” is sufficiently widespread, the manager prefers not to buy insurance
by moving across firms, because the risk of being revealed to be a bad type is low
enough to be borne by him.
It is also interesting to note that the upper bound θ defined by Proposition 5 may
equal or even exceed 1, so that mobility will occur in the interval (θ, 1). In this case,
while the manager will eventually stop moving if his reputation becomes sufficiently
bad, a manager with good enough reputation will never stop moving across firms.
5 Extensions
In this section we consider several extensions of the baseline two-period model. First,
we relax the assumption that on average managers add value, i.e., consider the case in
which y−(1−p)c < y: we shall see that in this parameter region ex-post competition
may induce firms to assign managers to the skill-insensitive project β and thus forgo
learning about managers’ quality. Second, we allow for pay to be conditional on
the actual payoff of the project and on the decision to leave or not, and show that
under competition firms will never exploit such conditionality in their offers. Third,
we allow for the presence of switching costs in the managerial labor market, and
show that they reduce mobility. Fourth, we consider the case in which managers
have superior information about their skills, and show that also the presence of
asymmetric information reduces managerial mobility. Finally, we allow mobility to
improve the efficiency of the match between firms and managers, and show that this
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“bright side of mobility” may outweigh its efficiency costs emphasized in the baseline
model. In all of these extensions, to simplify notation we assume the payoff of project
β to be riskless: y˜ = y. This simplification entails no loss of generality.
5.1 Insuring human capital risk without mobility
Our model is related to that by Harris and Holmstrom (1982), who show that labor
market competition and worker mobility prevent full insurance by firms. In our
model, however, employers can overcome the Harris-Holmstrom problem by assigning
managers to projects whose payoff is not skill-sensitive: this enables them to provide
full insurance, because it hides workers’ productivity to competitors, although it also
creates an efficiency cost for the firm itself, as it prevents the firm from assigning the
employee to the most suitable project.
In the baseline version of the model, we effectively assumed this cost to be so high
as to make this option a dominated one: by (5), y − (1 − p)c > y, or equivalently
p > 1 − η, implying that even managers of unknown quality produce on average a
larger payoff when assigned to project α than to project β, so that firms always prefer
to assign managers to project α rather than β. Formally, in this case the manager’s
expected utility from being assigned to project β when his quality is unknown, (1 +
ρ)u(y), is strictly smaller than the expected utility under competition (19), and thus
a fortiori also smaller than the expected utility under no competition (13).
In this subsection, we consider the opposite case where p < 1 − η, so that on
average project β dominates project α, although we maintain the assumption that,
when entrusted to a good manager, project α is still superior to project β (i.e., y > y).
Specifically, suppose that the firm assigns project β to a manager of unknown quality,
so that it does not learn anything about his talent. Then, with p < (1− η), the
project β may become preferable to project α even in the absence of competition,
which implies that assigning project β to all managers becomes the first-best project
allocation. This happens when the probability p of a good manager is smaller than
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the threshold p such that
(1 + ρ)u(y) = u(y − (1− p)c) + ρu(py + (1− p)y), (28)
where the right-hand side is the utility that the manager obtains from project α
under no competition, and is increasing in p. Intuitively, for p < p learning requires
such a high likelihood of failure that it is more efficient to forgo it.
However, the more interesting case is that in which learning would be efficient
in the absence of competition but the firm prefers to forgo it in the presence of
competition. This happens if the probability p of a good manager is in the range [p, p],
where p is such that the expected utility under competition (19) equates u(y)(1 + ρ):
notice that p exceeds p because for any p expression (19) is smaller than (13), and
they are both increasing in p. Intuitively, for p ∈ (p, p) the choice of project β enables
the firm to provide full insurance to its employees, which under competition would be
impossible to achieve if employees were assigned to project α. This comes at the cost
of forgoing learning about employees’ productivity. But if the probability of good
managers is below p, the cost of forgone learning is worth bearing when compared to
the benefit of providing insurance to employees.
To summarize:
Proposition 6 (Insurance vs. learning) If p < 1− η, three cases can occur: (i)
if p < p, then firms will assign employees to project β and therefore not learn their
ability but fully insure them, irrespective of labor market competition; (ii) if p ∈ (p, p),
then firms will assign employees to project β under competition and to project α under
no competition, so that in both cases employees are fully insured but there is learning
only under no competition; and, (iii) if p > p, firms will assign employees to project
α and the results are as in the baseline model.
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5.2 Conditional pay
In the baseline version of the model, we assumed that the wage in period 1 cannot
be contingent (i) on the actual payoff of the project assigned to the manager, or (ii)
on the manager’s decision to resign and leave the firm. In this section we remove
this assumption and show that in equilibrium firms will not make pay conditional on
these additional outcomes.
With conditional pay, the employer can defer compensation after the realization
of the cash-flows and can choose a different pay when the manager stays or leaves.
First, it is easy to show that even if managerial pay could be conditioned on the actual
payoff of the project assigned to the manager, competition will induce firms to set
pay equal to the manager’s expected payoff from the project, given the manager’s
perceived quality: ex-ante competition for risk-averse managers will lead risk-neutral
firms to offer contracts that are not performance-based.
Next, the employer (firm k) may want to choose a different pay when the manager
stays or leaves. By doing so, firm k can increase the chances of retaining manager i
by paying him a salary wik1 = 0 if he leaves, and a fixed wage equal to the expected
output wik1 = y − (1− p)c if he does not leave.
Given this contract, if the manager stays, his expected utility is
u(y − (1− p)c) + ρ[pu(y) + (1− p)u(y)], (29)
since he is paid y− (1− p)c at the end of the first period and his continuation utility
in the second period is u(y) with probability p (when his type is found to be G) and
u(y) with probability 1− p (when his type is found to be B).
If he moves, his expected utility depends on whether θL is large enough that the
manager is assigned to project α even when the period-1 payoff is low, which happens
only if η ≥ 1− θL. Hence, if η ≥ 1− θL, the expected utility from moving is:
ρ[pu (y − (1− θH)c) + (1− p)u (y − (1− θL)c)]; (30)
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if η < 1− θL, then the expected utility from moving is:
ρ[pu (y − (1− θH)c) + (1− p)u(y)]. (31)
Comparing the equations above we can show:
Proposition 7 (Decision to move with conditional pay) Manager i moves if
and only if:
(1− p) [u (y − (1− θL)c)− u(y)] ≥ p [u(y)− u (y − (1− θH)c)] + u(y − (1− p)c)
ρ
,
where θH ≡ λ + (1− λ)p and θL ≡ (1− λ)p. In all other cases, manager i does not
move.
Comparing Proposition 2 and 6, it is immediate that moving is less likely with
conditional pay than without it. Moreover, only a sufficiently patient manager (one
with sufficiently high ρ) chooses to move.
Will firms use conditional pay? In the model, there is ex-ante competition for
managers, who are a scarce resource. Hence, managers extract all the surplus.
Whether firms use conditional pay depends on whether this contract clause increases
managers’ expected utility.
Quite clearly, conditional pay will not be used when moving is optimal in Propo-
sition 2. As a matter of fact, the expected utility with conditional pay in equation
(30) is strictly lower than the expected utility without conditional pay in equation
(16). Hence, competition will drive firms to offer pay that is not conditional on their
moving decision.
The manager’s expected utility is also strictly greater when condition (18) is met.
To see this, notice that the expected utility from moving if there is no conditional
pay is:
u(y − (1− p)c) + ρ[pu (y − (1− θH)c) + (1− p)u (y − (1− θL)c)], (32)
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which is strictly larger than (29) whenever condition (18) is met.
Finally, the manager’s expected utility is identical with and without conditional
pay when (18) is violated. To summarize:
Proposition 8 (Equilibrium compensation) In equilibrium, no firm will condi-
tion pay on the manager’s decision to move to another firm.
5.3 Switching costs
In Section 3.4 we have compared two extreme labor market regimes: one in which
there is perfect ex-post competition and another where there is no competition at all.
In this section we consider the intermediate case in which managers suffer a switching
cost s if they switch employers. The cases analyzed so far correspond to the case in
which s = 0 (perfect competition) and s > u(y) (no competition).
With switching costs s ∈ (0, u(y)), if the manager stays, his continuation utility
is as in equation (15). If he moves, his expected utility depends on both θL and s. If
η ≥ 1− θL, then the expected utility from moving is:
max{pu (y − (1− θH)c) + (1− p)u (y − (1− θL)c)− s, 0}; (33)
if η < 1− θL, then the expected utility from moving is:
max{pu (y − (1− θH)c) + (1− p)u(y)− s, 0} (34)
Hence:
Proposition 9 (Decision to move with switching costs) Manager i moves if
and only if
(1− p) [u (y − (1− θL)c)− u(y)]− s ≥ p [u(y)− u (y − (1− θH)c)] ,
where θH ≡ λ + (1− λ)p and θL ≡ (1− λ)p. In all other cases, manager i does not
move.
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Comparing the condition in Proposition 8 with that in Proposition 2, it is im-
mediate that the higher the switching costs s, the smaller the parameter region in
which managerial mobility is worthwhile.
5.4 Asymmetric information
The assumption of symmetric information between firms and managers is critical
to our results. If all managers knew their type, then in equilibrium no insurance
could be obtained by moving: good managers would stay with their firms to reveal
themselves as good and get higher pay. Bad managers would then also be revealed
and be assigned to projects of type β from period 2 onwards.
A less extreme assumption is one where only a fraction φ of managers know their
type from the start. In this case, in equilibrium mobility decreases for two reasons:
(i) mechanically, the fraction pφ of managers who know they are good will stick with
their employer to demonstrate their type; and (ii) managers of unknown type will
get pooled with those who know they are bad, and so will be less willing to move
than in the baseline model.
This happens because the probabilities of the manager’s type being good, condi-
tional on the two observed outcomes of project α, change as follows:
θH =
(1− φ)[λ+ p(1− λ)]
(1− φ)[λ+ p(1− λ)] + (1− p)(1− λ) ≤ λ+ (1− λ)p, (35)
and
θL =
(1− φ)p(1− λ)
(1− φ)p(1− λ) + λ+ (1− p)(1− λ) ≤ (1− λ)p, (36)
where both θH and θL are decreasing in φ. Hence, condition (18) in Proposition 1 is
less likely to be met. To summarize:
Proposition 10 (Decision to move with asymmetric information)
Managers are less likely to move as the degree of asymmetric information φ
increases.
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5.5 Allowing for the matching gains from competition
We now consider the case in which there is heterogeneity of both firms and workers,
assuming that there is a chance mi = m < 1 that worker i is well matched with his
initial employer. Before the end of the first period (and before moving), the manager
learns whether there was a good match or not, as in Jovanovic (1979) and the vast
subsequent literature on learning in labor economics. For simplicity, we assume that
this information increases the chance of a good match with the next employer from
m to 1, as the employee perfectly learns which type of firm is appropriate for him.
The payoffs for project α are as in the baseline case in case of a good match, and
are the same as with project β in case of mismatch.9 Specifically, if manager i stays
with firm k the payoffs are
yαi =

y with probability miIi,
y − c with probability mi(1− Ii),
y with probability 1−mi,
(37)
where, as before, the indicator Ii = 1[qi=H] denotes manager i’s type and mi =
{0,m, 1}, depending on whether manager i is a bad, unknown or good match for
firm k. If instead the manager moves the payoffs are
yαi =

y with probability mi[(1− β)p+ βIi],
y − c with probability mi[(1− β)(1− p) + β(1− Ii)],
y with probability 1−mi.
(38)
Notice that, as in the baseline case, staying or moving does not affect the expected
payoff of the project already initiated by the manager, but moving reduces the prob-
ability of learning about his managerial talent.
Consider first the benchmark case with no ex-post competition. In this case, as
in the baseline model, there is full insurance but now there is a cost arising from the
possible mismatch between manager i and firm k. The expected utility is:
V0 = u(mpy +m(1− p)(y − c) + (1−m)y) + ρu(mpy + (1−mp)y). (39)
9This assumption is without loss of generality. The only requirement is that the payoff in case
of mismatch is independent of (and thus uninformative about) managerial quality.
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Specifically, the manager is assigned to the project α in the first period and is paid the
expected payoff that he produces. In the second period, the manager’s assignment
depends on the first period’s payoffs: the manager is assigned again to project α only
if in the first period yαi = y; in all other cases, the manager is assigned to project β.
As in the first period, the employer insures the manager by paying him a fixed wage
equal to the expected payoff.
In the case of ex-post competition, the manager now faces a greater benefit from
moving than in the baseline case: in case of mismatch, by moving the manager can
find a better match. As shown in the following proposition, the benefit from moving
may be so large that the expected utility under ex-post competition may exceed that
obtained in the absence of ex-post competition:
Proposition 11 (Bright side of competition) If firms and workers are suffi-
ciently heterogeneous (i.e., if the probability m of a good match is low enough), the
equilibrium with ex-post competition dominates that with no ex-post competition.
Intuitively, when a random allocation of employees across firms would feature a
high degree of mismatch, the welfare gain from reallocating employees across firms
dominates that from learning about the talent of the employees of each firm and
reallocating them across its projects.
6 Conclusions
The efficient allocation of talent is also considered to be the prime function of a
competitive market for managers (see Gabaix and Landier, 2008, among others).
Here, however, we show that when projects have risks that materialize only in the
long term, there may be a dark side to competition for managers: by destroying
the boundary of the firm that encapsulates its employees, short-run labor market
opportunities interfere with the long-run information-gathering function of the firm.
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Competition hampers each firm’s ability to provide insurance to risk-averse employ-
ees, and at the same time allows managers to churn across employers so as to delay
the resolution of uncertainty about their talent; but by doing so they also hinder
their employers’ ability to allocate them efficiently across projects.
Our model has important policy implications for the financial sector, where
projects with long-run risk are often available. In our inefficient churning equilib-
rium, no individual financial institution has the incentive to deviate and unilaterally
stop competing for the others’ managers, so that only intervention by a public au-
thority can stop banks from poaching one another’s managers.10 No employer can
insulate itself from such competition unless all its employees signed a no-compete
clause that is enforceable – a possibility that is precluded in our regime with ex-post
competition. Our model implies that discouraging managerial mobility – say, taxing
relatively young managers who switch jobs – can improve efficiency: if such a surtax
were high enough, it would effectively move the economy to the first best (although
in equilibrium it would not be paid, since managers would not switch jobs). In short,
a policy prescription deriving from the model is to “throw sand in the wheels” of the
managerial labor market.11
Another policy implication of the model is capping managerial compensation
in banks. How would this change the equilibrium with managerial competition?
Capping managers’ pay at the first-best level would prevent employers from poaching
good managers in the competitive regime and make the perfect risk-sharing and
no-churning outcome sustainable in equilibrium. Hence, capping the pay of top
10This idea is captured well by Tett (2009): “Banks operate in a world where their star talent
is apt to jump between different groups, whenever a bigger pay-packet appears, with scant regard
for corporate loyalty or employment contracts. The result is that the compensation committees of
many banks feel utterly trapped. [...] It is time, in other words, for bankers and regulators to [...]
start debating not just the issue of pay, but also the poaching culture that is at the root of those
huge bonus figures.”
11One such proposal is currently being considered by the Bank of England, which wants to tighten
up rules around so-called “bonus buyouts”, whereby banks compensate newly hired employees for
any remuneration cancelled by their previous employer when they changed jobs (Bank of England
Prudential Regulation Authority, 2016).
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financial managers may respond not only to ethical or political concerns but also to
an efficiency rationale: reducing the excessive risk-taking associated with churning.
Indeed, according to the model, an appropriate pay cap would raise the expected
utility of managers themselves.12
Admittedly, in more elaborate models some of these policy interventions would
entail efficiency costs. Either a salary cap or an equivalent surtax on managerial
mobility would redistribute income from good to bad managers, which could decrease
efficiency in a model in which managers themselves invest in their own quality ex
ante – by investing in better education, say. In this case, capping their salary would
reduce the “average alpha” of managers in equilibrium. Moreover, preventing the
reallocation of managerial talent could have other efficiency costs: as we have shown
in the last of the extensions of the model, if both managers and firms are sufficiently
heterogeneous, so that allowing bad matches to be dissolved and new ones formed can
dominate those from the appropriate allocation of talent to projects within each firm.
Finally, limiting managerial mobility may give market power to firms and create hold-
up problems. In our setting, this is inconsequential because of ex-ante competition,
but in reality this assumption too might not hold. While all this suggests the need for
caution in drawing policy conclusions, our analysis highlights that the competition
for managerial talent may generate inefficiencies that have been so far neglected and
are potentially policy relevant.
12Interestingly, also in the setting of Be´nabou and Tirole (2015) a cap on managerial pay, hence
a reduction in its sensitivity to performance, can restore the first-best outcome.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. If the manager stays, his type is revealed. In this case, if
θ = 1, the manager is assigned to project α; if instead θ = 0, he is assigned to project
β. If the manager moves, the project allocation depends on the realized period-1
payoff. If the period-1 project was successful (yik1 = y˜+y−y), so that his reputation
is θH > p, the manager is assigned to project α, because the assumption η > 1− p in
(6) implies η > 1− θH . If the period-1 project failed (yik1 = y˜ + y − y − c), so that
the manager’s reputation is θL, he is assigned to project α only if η ≥ 1− θL.
Proof of Proposition 2. Comparing (15) with (17), it is immediate that the
manager does not move if η < 1− θL. This happens because the payoff in the good
state (which happens with probability p) is strictly lower if the manager moves, while
the payoff in the bad state (which happens with probability 1− p) is the same.
The manager moves only if η ≥ 1 − θL and the expected utility in (16) exceeds
the expected utility in (15). This second condition, as stated in the Proposition, is
more stringent than the first: to see this, consider that the right-hand side of (18) is
positive, u(·) being an increasing function; but then the left-hand expression is also
positive, which requires that y − (1− θL)c > y, or equivalently to η > 1− θL.
Proof of Proposition 3. We assume that η ≥ 1 − θL, since otherwise the
manager never moves, by Proposition 2. If the manager moves his period-2 wage is
wM =
{
wMH = y − (1− λ− (1− λ)p)c if yi1 = y˜ + y − y,
wML = y − (1− (1− λ)p)c if yi1 = y˜ + y − y − c,
(40)
where we substituted θH and θL from (9), the subscript M stands for “moving”, and
the subscripts H and L refer to the high and low payoffs of the period-1 project
α, respectively (while we have dropped the time and the manager’s subscripts to
simplify notation). If instead the manager stays, his period-2 wage is
wS =
{
wSH = y if yi1 = y˜ + y − y,
wSL = y if yi1 = y˜ + y − y − c,
(41)
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where the subscript S stands for “staying”, and the subscripts H and L are defined
as in the previous expression.
(i) To show that by moving a manager receives a payoff with lower expected value but
higher variance, it is convenient to introduce the following notation for the expected
value and the variance of period-2 wage when moving and staying:
wM ≡ pwMH + (1− p)wML, σ2M ≡ p (wMH − wM)2 + (1− p) (wML − wM)2 ,
wS ≡ pwSH + (1− p)wSL, σ2S ≡ p (wSH − wS)2 + (1− p) (wSL − wS)2 .
If the manager moves, the expected payoff of the project is wM = y − (1 − p)c, as
can be seen by using (9) in (16), while it is wS = py + (1 − p)y if he stays with
his former employer: the difference between these two expressions is wM − wS =
(1 − p)(y − c − y) < 0 by assumption (5). The absolute value of this difference is
increasing in the frequency of bad managers, 1− p. To establish that σ2M < σ2S, it is
sufficient to show that wMH−wM < wSH−wS and that wM−wML < wS−wSL. The
first inequality can be rewritten as (1−p)(λ−η)c < 0, and the second as p(λ−η)c < 0,
and both of these inequalities hold since we are assuming η ≥ 1−θL = (1−p)+λp > λ.
(ii) To perform comparative statics, let us denote by ∆ the gain from moving, i.e.,
the change in the expected continuation utility when moving (16) relative to staying
(15):
∆ ≡ E [u(wM)]− E [u(wS)]
= (1− p) [u(y − (1− θL)c)− u(y)]− p [u(y)− u(y − (1− θH)c)] . (42)
To show that ∆ is increasing in η ≡ (y − y)/c, notice that it is increasing in y and
decreasing in y and c:
∂∆
∂y
= p [u′ (wMH)− u′ (wSH)] + (1− p)u′ (wML) > 0,
since wMH < wSH ;
∂∆
∂y
= −(1− p)u′(wSL) < 0;
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and
∂∆
∂c
= − [pu′ (wMH) (1− λ) + (1− (1− λ)p)u′ (wML)] (1− p) < 0.
Moreover, ∆ is decreasing in λ because
∂∆
∂λ
= [u′ (wMH)− u′ (wML)] p(1− p)c < 0,
since wMH > wML.
(iii) Finally, we wish to identify whether the gain from moving ∆ in equation (42) is
increasing in the manager’s risk aversion. Using the mean value theorem (as ∆ is a
continuous function),
∆ = (1− p)u′(w1)(η − 1 + θL)c− pu′(w2)(1− θH)c
= c[(1− p)u′(w1)(η − 1 + (1− λ)p)− pu′(w2)(1− p)(1− λ)]
= c(u′(w1)− u′(w2))p(1− p)(1− λ)− c(1− p)(1− η)u′(w1)
where w1 ∈ [y, y − (1− θL)c], w2 ∈ [y − (1− θH)c, y], and therefore u′(w1) > u′(w2)
in case of risk-averse managers.
Therefore,
Sign(∆) = Sign
(
u′(w1)− u′(w2)
u′(w1)
p(1− λ)− (1− η)
)
.
This expression is increasing in u
′(w1)−u′(w2)
u′(w1)
, which is itself increasing the risk aversion,
as it is the slope of the marginal utility.
Proof of Lemma 2. To show that V (θ) is increasing in θ, note that it increases
both the manager’s future wages and the conditional probabilities of good outcomes
relative to bad ones. First, each of the instantaneous utility functions u(wt) in ex-
pression (20) is increasing in wt, and the wages wt are increasing in the manager’s
reputation θt by (24). Second, an increase in θt−1 raises reputation at each future
date {θt, θt+1, θt+2, ...}, by expression (22). Hence, it increases the conditional prob-
ability of the good outcome y and decreases that of the bad outcome y −c, which
raises expected utility.
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To show that V (θ) is bounded above by VH , notice that, by expressions (20) and
(27), V (θt−1)− VH can be written as follows:
VH − V (θt−1) = [u(y)− u(wt)] + ρmax{(1− θt−1)(VH − VL),
[λθt−1 + (1− λ)p]E
[ ∞∑
s=0
ρs [u(y)− u(wt+1+s)] |θUt
]
+[1− λθt−1 − (1− λ)p]E
[ ∞∑
s=0
ρs [u(y)− u(wt+1+s)] |θDt
]}
.
This expression is strictly positive, as each of the differences that enter it is strictly
positive, recalling expression (24) for the wages. Symmetrically, V (θt−1)−VL can be
written as follows:
V (θt−1)− VL = [u(wt)− u(y)] + ρmax{θt−1(VH − VL),
[λθt−1 + (1− λ)p]E
[ ∞∑
s=0
ρs [u(wt+1+s)− u(y)] |θUt
]
+[1− λθt−1 − (1− λ)p]E
[ ∞∑
s=0
ρs [u(wt+1+s)− u(y)] |θDt
]}
.
Also this expression is strictly positive, as each of the differences entering it is strictly
positive, again using expression (24) for the wages.
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider first a value θt−1 < 1 − η so low that the
manager will be assigned to the β project if he moves. In this case, his continuation
utility from moving is VL, while his utility from staying is VL + θt−1(VH − VL) > VL,
so that the manager chooses to stay. This suggests that there is a value θ = θ that
makes the manager indifferent between staying and moving. This value is such that
θ(1−δ−)
1−θδ− < 1 − η < θ(1−δ
+)
1−θδ+ , so that, if he moves, the manager will be assigned to the
β project if his output in period t is low and the α project if his output is high. The
associated continuation utility is VL in the former case and V
(
θ(1−δ+)
1−θδ+
)
> VL in the
latter case. Hence, the value θ at which the manager is indifferent between moving
and staying is such that θ(VH − VL) = [λθ+ (1− λ)p][V
(
θ(1−δ+)
1−θδ+
)
− VL]. Notice that
θ > 0, as V
(
θ(1−δ+)
1−θδ+
)
−VL > 0; and θ < p, since θ(VH−VL) < [λθ+(1−λ)p](VH−VL)
– 43 –
and V
(
θ(1−δ+)
1−θδ+
)
< VH . Because V (θ) is increasing in θ, for all θt−1 < θ, staying
dominates moving.
Consider next managers with high reputation. There is a reputation level θt−1 =
θ ≤ 1 such that the manager is indifferent between staying and leaving. For θ > θ,
because V (θ) is increasing in θ, staying dominates moving and thus V
(
θ(1−δ+)
1−θδ+
)
=
VL+
θ(1+δ+)
1+θδ+
(VH−VL). Hence, θ is such that θ(VH−VL) = [λθ+(1−λ)p] θ(1+δ+)1+θδ+ (VH−
VL) + [1−λθ− (1−λ)p][V
(
θ(1−δ−)
1−θδ−
)
−VL]. As the right-hand side of this equation is
strictly positive and the equation is trivially met when θ = 1, it follows that θ ∈ (0, 1].
Combining the two above results, churning occurs at time t if θt−1 ∈ [θ, θ], provided
churning occurred in every previous period. For this to happen, churning must occur
in the first period. Since, θ0 = p, this happens if and only if θ ≥ p, which also implies
that θ > θ. If instead θ < p, churning never occurs.
Proof of Proposition 7. Comparing (29) with (31), it is immediate that the
manager does not move if η < 1− θL. This happens because the payoff in the good
state (which occurs with probability p) is strictly lower if the manager moves, while
the payoff in the bad state (which occurs with probability 1− p) is the same.
The manager moves only if η ≥ 1 − θL and the expected utility in (30) exceeds the
expected utility in (29). The second condition simplifies to the one stated in the
Proposition, which implies η > 1 − θL by the same argument used in the proof of
Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 9. As before, the manager does not move if η < 1− θL.
If instead η ≥ 1 − θL and s < pu (y − (1− θH)c) + (1 − p)u(y), the manager moves
only if (33) exceeds the expected utility in (15). The latter condition simplifies to
the one stated in the Proposition, which implies η > 1 − θL by the same argument
used in the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 11. In case of a good match, the expected utility from
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staying is pu(y) + (1− p)u(y), while the expected utility from moving is pu(y− (1−
θH)c) + (1−p)u(max(y, y− (1− θL)c)), as in the baseline model. The choice whether
to stay or to move is then as characterized in Proposition 2. In case of a mismatch,
the expected utility from staying is u(y), while the expected utility from moving is
u(py + (1− p)(y− c)) because the manager is offered a new start and full insurance.
Since by assumption (5), py + (1− p)(y − c) > y, the manager always moves in case
of a mismatch.
To compare the cases with and without ex-post competition, notice that the first-
period expected utility is the same in the two cases. Following from the analysis
in the previous paragraph, the second-period expected utility in the competitive
equilibrium is
mmax{pu(y − (1− θH)c) + (1− p)u(max(y, y − (1− θL)c)),
pu(y) + (1− p)u(y)}+ (1−m)u(py + (1− p)(y − c)).
This expression exceeds the second-period utility in the equilibrium without ex-post
competition, which is u(mpy+(1−mp)y) as shown in equation (39), for m sufficiently
close to 0. The opposite happens in a neighborhood of m = 1, which represents the
baseline case analyzed in the previous sections.
– 45 –
References
Acharya, V., and P. Volpin. 2010. Corporate Governance Externalities. Review of
Finance, 14:1–33.
Axelson, U., and P. Bond. 2015. Wall Street Occupations. Journal of Finance,
70:1949–1996.
Bank of England Prudential Regulation Authority. 2016. Buy-outs of Variable
Remuneration. Consultation Paper CP2/16, London.
Bell, B. D., and J. Van Reenen. 2013. Extreme wage inequality: pay at the very
top. American Economic Review 103:153–157.
Be´nabou, R., and J. Tirole. 2016. Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and
Multitasking. Journal of Political Economy, 124:305–370.
Berger, A. N., N. H. Miller, M. A. Petersen, R. G. Rajan, and J. C. Stein. 2005.
Does function follow organizational form? Evidence from the lending practices
of large and small banks. Journal of Financial Economics 76:237–269.
Dicks, D. 2012. Executive Compensation and the Role for Corporate Governance
Regulation. Review of Financial Studies, 25:1971–2004.
Frydman, C. 2007. Rising Through the Ranks: The Evolution of the Market for
Corporate Executives, 1936-2003. Working Paper, Boston University.
Gabaix, X., and A. Landier. 2008. Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much? Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 123:49–100.
Harris, M., and B. Holmstrom. 1982. A Theory of Wage Dynamics. Review of
Economic Studies 49:315–333.
Hirshleifer, J. 1971. The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward
to Inventive Activity. American Economic Review 61:561–574.
– 46 –
Huson, M. R., R. Parrino, and L. T. Starks. 2001. Internal Monitoring Mechanisms
and CEO Turnover: A Long-Term Perspective. Journal of Finance 56:2265–
2297.
Jovanovic, B. 1979. Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover. Journal of Political
Economy 87:972–990.
Makarov, I., and G. Plantin. 2015. Rewarding Trading Skills Without Inducing
Gambling. Journal of Finance 70:925–962.
Morrison, A. D., and W. J. Wilhelm Jr. 2008 The Demise of Investment Banking
Partnerships: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Finance 63:311–350.
Petersen, M. A., and R. G. Rajan. 2002. Does Distance Still Matter? The Informa-
tion revolution in Small Business Lending. Journal of Finance 57:2533–2570.
Philippon, T., and A. Reshef. 2012. Wages and Human Capital in the U.S. Finance
Industry: 1909–2006. Quarterly Journal of Economics 127:1551–1609.
Rajan, R. 2005. Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier? Proceedings,
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, August:313–369.
Richardson, M., and I. Walter. 2009. Rethinking Compensation Practices in Fi-
nancial Firms. Chapter 8 in Acharya V. and M. Richardson, eds., Restoring
Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed System, John Wiley & Sons.
Smith, R. 2009. Greed is Good. Wall Street Journal, February 7.
Tett, G. 2009. What Bankers Can Learn From Chelsea Football Club. Financial
Times, September 11.
Thanassoulis, J. 2012. The Case of Intervening in Bankers’ Pay. Journal of Finance
67:849–895.
– 47 –
!!! !
p"
!!
Nature!picks!type!
Noise!
No!noise!
!!
!!
G 
B 
No!noise!
Noise!
!!
!!
!!""
p"
p"
""
""
Nature!picks!type!
p"
G 
B 
!!
"" !!
Project!α,!if!completed!by!its!initiator:!
Project!α,!if!not!completed!by!its!initiator:!
λ"
1−λ"
λ"
1−λ"
Figure 1: Expected payoffs of project α
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Figure 3: Moving decision and risk aversion in the 2-period model
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Figure 4: Time line of the infinite-horizon model
– 50 –
